The Case for Social Rights by Mantouvalou, Virginia
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2010 
The Case for Social Rights 
Virginia Mantouvalou 
Georgetown University Law Center, vm235@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/331 
 
Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, 
and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2010 
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 10-18 
 
 
The Case for Social Rights 
in 
DEBATING SOCIAL RIGHTS 
(Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010) 
 
 
Virginia Mantouvalou 
Visiting Scholar 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Senior Lecturer in Law 
University of Leicester 
vm235@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/331/ 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588220 
 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
THE CASE FOR SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 Virginia Mantouvalou 
 
 
1. Introduction 
You and I might desire different things. We each have distinct purposes and choose a 
distinct way of living. I might enjoy travelling to exotic islands, or to remote countries 
to get to know new cultures; you might prefer to spend your life reading literature, 
going to artistic exhibitions or drinking in the pub with your friends. We probably 
cannot convince each other that this or that activity is more worthwhile to pursue, 
because we each have a different conception of what makes a life worthwhile. There 
are certain goods, though, which are necessary in order for any conception of the 
good life to succeed. What are these necessary goods? I shall try to identify some by 
using an example from real life, and I am sure that there are plenty of other examples 
that you could come up with.  
Mr Limbuela from Angola, Mr Tesema from Ethiopia, and Mr Adam who 
claimed to be from Sudan, reached the United Kingdom to claim asylum. Having fled 
their countries, they hoped that they would at last be treated with respect. In the UK, 
though, while their asylum applications were pending, the Secretary of State decided 
to withdraw social support from them, for the reason that they did not apply for 
asylum as soon as reasonably practicable upon arrival to the country. Mr Limbuela 
had to sleep rough. He was frightened, he had no food, although he begged, and he 
was cold. Passers-by did not give him anything and the police refused to offer him a 
blanket. He was in pain because of ill-health. He was provided with shelter by a 
charity, but a few days later he was asked to leave. Mr Tesema was a bit more 
fortunate. Following the Home Secretary’s decision to withdraw welfare support, he 
applied for, and obtained, interim relief having convinced a judge that he would suffer 
in destitution if evicted from his emergency accommodation. While waiting for his 
asylum claim to be decided, Mr Adam slept in a sleeping bag inside a car park. When 
it rained, he got wet, and on one occasion he was abused by a passer by. He was 
getting ill; he could not understand why he had to sleep in a car park. Although Mr 
Limbuela, Mr Tesema and Mr Adam were hopeful when they arrived in the UK to 
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Center. This paper is part of the book Debating Social Rights, where I am making the case for social 
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claim asylum, they found themselves destitute, vulnerable to physical violence and 
unable to satisfy their most basic needs. Their situation was desperate.  
You and I are not in the position of Mr Limbuela, Mr Tesema and Mr Adam, 
but we would probably sympathise with them. We realise that living a life deprived of 
fundamental necessities, like shelter, food and basic healthcare, is a terrible plight. If 
we passed by and saw them begging, we might feel charitable and give them some 
food or some coins. Shelter, basic healthcare and nutrition are some of the material 
conditions that we need, the satisfaction of which many of us take for granted. But not 
everyone enjoys access to these goods, as the above example reminds us.  
Situations like that faced by Mr Limbuela, Mr Tesema and Mr Adam, are 
commonly described nowadays as violations of human rights. Although the notion of 
a violation of rights is often used to describe an injustice, there is a big discrepancy in 
the legal protection of some of these rights, the so-called ‘social and economic rights’, 
such as the right to healthcare or the right to housing, as opposed to ‘civil and political 
rights’, such as the right to life or the right to privacy. It would not be an exaggeration 
to say that the most pressing questions surrounding the legal protection of civil and 
political rights – rights which have traditionally been seen by liberal scholars as 
essential for a state that respects its citizens – have been largely settled today. Issues 
of freedom of religion, the right to privacy or the prohibition of torture have been and 
continue to be widely debated in courts, in academic literature, in public and political 
debates. Theoretical disagreement might still exist as regards certain subtle aspects of 
their material scope (the right to private life covers our activities at home, but do we 
have a right to engage in private activities when we are in public, for instance?), and 
violations persist in the real world. Yet few would contest their universal importance, 
their weight for individual autonomy, the need to protect them in law and to fight to 
address their violations in practice. Governments that breach civil and political rights 
tend to hide their actions. They are aware that disrespect for civil and political rights 
is condemned by the international community; if asked, they deny that they engage in 
torture or that they do not respect freedom of speech.  
In contrast to debates about civil and political rights, debates about social and 
economic rights are far from settled. The practical implementation of social rights in 
particular remains deeply controversial amongst activists, academic scholars, lawyers 
and judges alike. Some activists view social rights as worth fighting for, and employ 
the language of rights and their alleged violation as an all-encompassing rhetorical 
device to advance claims on injustice stemming from economic need. Other activists 
hold the view that there is little chance that social change will come about through 
‘rights talk’; what we really need is action, not ‘vacuous rhetoric’.  
Certain academic scholars are passionate about the importance and necessity 
of understanding the interests grounding social rights and to explore their protection 
through law. Others accept that the right to housing, the right to decent working 
conditions or the right to healthcare, are weighty moral and political considerations, 
but dispute their suitability for legal enforcement. Some view them as valid concerns, 
which should be left to philanthropy. Others believe that the idea that there are social 
rights is flawed by definition, because there is no such thing as an entitlement to 
resources. Finally, there are those who dislike the words ‘human rights’ altogether, 
both civil and political, and socio-economic; for they think that it is overly 
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individualistic, it depoliticises crucial political questions, distracts from political 
struggles and ultimately fails to address injustice.   
In this paper, I argue that social rights are ‘constitutional essentials’1 at 
domestic level, and claims of the highest priority in inter-state relations. Guaranteeing 
social rights through law is the best expression of how serious we are about our 
commitment to these claims. Our courts and elected representatives should endorse 
social rights, for a commitment to these claims shows that we care for the well-being 
of all, including the weakest and most vulnerable members of our societies. 
The first part of the paper explores the meaning of socio-economic rights and 
contains a brief presentation of their inclusion in legal documents. It finds that there is 
a discrepancy in the attention that the international community and several 
governments have paid to social rights when compared to their civil and political 
counterparts. The second section argues that this situation is unsatisfactory, because 
the moral weight and significance of social rights is as critical as that of civil and 
political rights, with which they bear close links and resemblance in any case. The 
third part turns to the law in more detail. My argument will be motivated by the belief 
that if we are committed to the values promoted by social rights, we need to make 
them enforceable. This part is divided in two sections. It first, explores the 
justiciability of social rights and the right of individual petition. This part suggests 
that social rights and their judicial protection may contribute in our quest for social 
justice, and that they may promote democracy, rather than undermine it. Yet the 
second section emphasises that we should not focus all our efforts on justiciability 
alone. It is crucial to realise that our legislators also have duties to legislate in a 
manner that will secure access to basic material conditions for the poor and 
vulnerable. The final part of the essay examines the content of social rights. It 
suggests that the endeavour to construe this content faces different challenges when 
examining the role of legislatures than when examining the role of courts, and 
explores some possibilities in rendering concrete the correlative duties of social 
rights.  
 
2. What Are Social Rights? 
Social rights are conventionally understood as rights to the meeting of basic needs 
that are essential for human welfare.2 Although we need to deepen our understanding 
of the justification for social rights, this definition serves to highlight the point that 
social rights are entitlements to the avoidance of severe deprivation, not rights to the 
satisfaction of individual preferences more generally. They incorporate a safeguard 
ision of a life in luxury. They are claims with some 
 
1 I am borrowing the term ‘constitutional essentials’ from John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2005, 3rd edition) p. 227. Rawls did not include social rights in the 
constitutional essentials. For an argument that welfare rights are constitutional essentials, see L Sager, 
‘The Why of Constitutional Essentials’, (2003-2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 1421.  
2 F Michelman, ‘On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’, (1969-1970) 83 Harvard 
Law Review 7. On the role of needs for political morality see D Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, 
(Oxford, OUP, 1987) Chapter 1. The terms ‘social’ or ‘social and economic’ rights will be used 
interchangeably in this paper to refer to this type of claims. Cultural rights, which are often grouped 
together with economic and social rights, are beyond the scope of this essay. 
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urgency representing vital interests of the individual to avoid harm. They do not 
guarantee access to the goods that we each might desire to possess, so as to live a 
fulfilling life; they are preconditions for the pursuance of a good life.  
Which social rights should our list include? What amounts to a basic need is 
not self-evident. As a starting point, a list of social rights could be drawn by reference 
to legal documents that reflect the perceived basic needs mostly perhaps in developed 
industrialised countries. This could contain the following entitlements: 
a) a right to housing; 
b) a right to basic nutrition, including a right to water; 
c) a right to basic healthcare, because ill-health can lead to severe human suffering; 
d) a right to education; 
e) a right to social security and social assistance; 
f) a right to work and decent working conditions; 
g) a right to form and join a trade union, including a right to collective bargaining and 
a right to strike. 
Social rights are haunted by Cold War ideologies. The international community 
did not distinguish between civil, political and socio-economic rights in one of its 
most influential texts, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted 
under the auspices of the United Nations in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
The first provisions of the Declaration incorporate rights such as freedom of religion, 
freedom of expression and the prohibition of torture. From article 22 onwards we find 
social rights, such as the right to social security, to work, to an adequate standard of 
living, to rest and leisure, including holidays with pay.   
‘What the modern communists have done is to appropriate the word “rights” for 
the principles that they believe in’,3 declared Maurice Cranston, one of the staunchest 
opponents of social rights, referring to their inclusion in the UDHR. Cranston’s 
statement encapsulates well the climate of the Cold War that haunts social rights to 
date. Yet the ‘modern communists’ failed later on. When the international community 
had to consider whether to make the UDHR legally enforceable, human rights were 
split into two United Nations Covenants, which were adopted in 1961 and entered 
into force in 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Rights such as freedom of religion and the right to life were incorporated in the 
ICCPR. The ICESCR, on the other hand, included rights such as the right to shelter 
and the right to healthcare. In a way that mirrors the separation of human rights into 
the two UN Covenants, at a regional level the Council of Europe and the Organisation 
of American States, separated civil and political rights and economic and social rights 
in two documents: the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the 
European Social Charter (1961), and the American Convention on Human Rights 
more extensive socio-economic guaranties than its 
 
3 M Cranston, Human Rights To-day (London, Ampersand, 1962) pp. 38-39. 
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European counterpart - and the San Salvador Additional Protocol in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1999). From the general regional instruments, 
the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (1981) opted for the model of the 
UDHR, and included social rights alongside civil and political rights.  
The division of human rights in most international human rights treaties was 
coupled by striking differences in their wording and monitoring. Civil and political 
rights were drafted in an imperative manner: they could and should be immediately 
protected. Socio-economic rights appeared in a language that was far less imperative 
and far more conditional: they cannot be realised immediately, they require resources 
and states have discretion as to the steps that they will take to provide them. At the 
same time, and as if the separation of human rights in two documents was not an 
adequate statement of the inferior status that the international community decided to 
afford to social rights, the drafters of the European Social Charter (ESC) took a step 
further. They differentiated socio-economic from civil and political rights by opting 
for a peculiar a la carte formulation. States that decided to sign up to this treaty would 
not have to comply with all its provisions. They could choose some of them with 
which to abide, ignoring the rest.4  
The division of human rights into two categories should not bother us, unless it 
has practical consequences. And it does. In the context of the UN, the ICCPR, from 
early on in its history, recognised a right to individual petition before the Human 
Rights Committee in an additional protocol. Everyone within the contracting states’ 
jurisdiction has a right to bring a complaint for an alleged violation of the Covenant; 
the Committee examines it and adopts a Communication establishing whether there 
has been a breach of the ICCPR. The ICESCR, on the other hand, is only monitored 
through reporting procedures. States undertake an obligation to submit periodic 
reports to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights regarding 
compliance with the ICESCR, which then issues Concluding Observations. It was not 
until 2008, after lengthy, heated debates, that an optional protocol on individual 
petition for violations of social rights came into force. At regional level, the European 
and American systems have opted for a model similar to the UN. The European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides for a right to individual application 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The European Social Charter, 
has a reporting procedure before the European Committee of Social Rights, and since 
1996 a Protocol that recognises a right of collective complaint to certain non-
governmental organisations, trade unions and other groups. The American 
Convention on Human Rights, in a similar vein, is monitored by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, where individuals can lodge an application for an alleged 
violation of the rights under the Convention, while the San Salvador Protocol in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural rights is still ineffective.  
The disparity in the protection of social rights at an international level has 
been mirrored at a domestic level. The debate over whether social rights should be 
enforceable through law is in some countries more advanced and more settled than in 
5 neglected aspect of the US Constitution, which only 
t has traditionally been interpreted narrowly by the US 
 
4 European Social Charter, article 20. 
5 For a general overview of the key issues in several jurisdictions see M Langford (ed.), Social Rights 
Jurisprudence (Cambridge, CUP, 2008). 
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Supreme Court as a prohibition of discrimination. The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms only protects civil and political rights in a manner similar to the ECHR. 
In Europe, the 1998 UK Human Rights Act incorporated most rights of the ECHR 
into domestic law, without incorporating the provisions of the European Social 
Charter. In several other countries, such as Greece, Spain and Norway, there is a list 
of socio-economic entitlements in the Constitutions. Yet often in these examples, 
social rights are not afforded equal status to civil and political rights. They are drafted 
in weaker terms, and sometimes also included under the heading ‘directive principles 
of policy’. The same can be observed in other jurisdictions such as India, Argentina, 
Japan and Colombia. There are, finally, few examples where social rights are fully 
justiciable, like South Africa and Brazil.  
The disparity in the constitutional protection afforded to social rights from one 
country to the other is enormous, but what emerges is that most of the times, even if 
social rights figure in a legally enforceable document of a higher status than ordinary 
legislation, they seem to assume a somewhat secondary role to civil and political 
rights. At the risk of over-simplification and over-generalisation, it can fairly be said 
that, overall, there is a significant discrepancy in the constitutional protection of social 
rights, when compared to that of civil and political rights. The latter group of 
entitlements is usually set out in Bills of Rights, which are sometimes entrenched, 
meaning that they are given a higher status than ordinary law and can be modified or 
repealed only through special procedures. As social rights are most often not 
protected in Bills of Rights, legislation or other state action that breaches, say, the 
right to housing or the right to work, is at best susceptible to a lower degree of 
scrutiny than civil rights. In the few examples, such as South Africa or Brazil, where 
social rights are set out in the Constitution side by side with civil and political rights, 
the possibility of asserting them judicially through individual petition exists in a 
manner similar to civil and political rights. Finally, in countries where social rights 
are drafted as directive principles of social policy and contain an express clause on 
non-justiciability, such as India, courts have sometimes examined social rights in the 
context of other directly justiciable civil and political rights.  
Of course, some of the countries that do not protect social rights in their 
Constitutions might grant welfare protection to their citizens through ordinary 
legislation. Sweden is a good example of a country with a very strong tradition in 
social legislation. The concern is that in these cases the protection of social rights is 
vulnerable to change: in practice, little can stop a conservative government from 
repealing this legislation if the economic or social circumstances change (or if 
otherwise so minded), unless social entitlements are constitutionalised or protected in 
international law through a supervisory machinery. At the same time, if civil and 
political rights are constitutionally entrenched while social rights are protected only 
by ordinary legislation, there is an imbalance in the commitment to a higher status 
that a legal system undertakes, which, as it will be argued, is hard to justify. 
Today, several decades after the end of the Cold War, social rights are still the 
Cinderella of human rights law. Their weaker protection as compared to civil and 
political rights seems troubling. It suggests that having the right to express ourselves 
freely or to enjoy privacy are weightier or fundamentally different considerations than 
having a shelter and a job, water and food. Is this correct? 
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3. Common Foundations and Common Misconceptions 
The international community and liberal governments the world over have drawn a 
sharp line between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic 
rights, on the other. The discrepancy in the protection between the two reflects a 
failure to capture the vital interests underlying the former, and a failure to mark the 
urgency of the requirement that they be recognised as principles of a higher status, 
standards towards which state action should strive and against which it should be 
measured.  
There are many ways in which someone can argue for the importance of 
socio-economic rights but here two key ideas will be used to challenge the traditional 
dichotomy, both involving the relationship between social rights, on the one hand, and 
civil and political rights, on the other. The first section suggests that social rights have 
shared foundations with civil and political rights. The second section argues that the 
supposed conceptual differences between the two groups of entitlements are much 
more limited than it was once thought.  
 
Dignity, Liberty, Citizenship 
The conceptualisation of the person in many Constitutions and treaties is wanting, 
because it prioritises some essential conditions of our well-being, while neglecting 
others. All human rights – civil, political, economic and social – can be based on a 
plurality of foundations.6 Yet the neglect of social rights strikes at the heart of our 
dignity, liberty and the sense of belonging to our community: the very same values 
that ground civil and political rights. 
 
Dignity  
Severe poverty can lead to a variety of adverse predicaments that can be an affront to 
our being. It might bring inability to access medication in case of illness, no money 
for food, no housing or no education. A life in desperate need is a life in which a 
person lacks the essentials to live in dignity. A person’s dignity is respected when her 
life and agency are protected, and when others are not permitted to treat her in a 
degrading and unfair manner.7 Dignity is also closely connected to the idea of self-
respect and the respect of the others. It has to do with how we view ourselves, which 
also depends on how those that are around us regard us. Dignity lies in the heart of 
our humanity and grounds the most fundamental elements that are essential for the 
human condition. It is commonly said that dignity is the most appropriate and least 
controversial basis for human rights, for it appertains to everyone simply by virtue of 
being human. For this reason, it is also pronounced in several Constitutions and other 
human rights documents. Extreme socio-economic need deprives a person of the 
ency. It also leads to degrading life conditions. One 
 
6 J Tasioulas, ‘Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin’s Steps’, 
(2002) 10 European Journal of Philosophy 79 at 95 and J Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 
(Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edition, 2007) Chapter 4. 
7 J Nickel, as above, p. 66. 
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exampls of extreme poverty can help us realise its catastrophic effect on human 
dignity. 
Drinking water when we are thirsty or to get our 1.5 litres of recommended 
daily intake, basic sanitation or a relaxing foam bath, making a soup when we are 
hungry, a coffee or tea when we are sleepy or cold, are all activities that many of us 
take for granted. Lack of water brings thirst and hunger, inadequate personal hygiene, 
illness and may lead to death. Life without water, insofar as someone survives, is an 
undignified life, because water is a necessary condition for meeting some of the most 
basic requirements of a decent life. Water is not a luxury, then, unlike a fizzy drink or 
a beer. It is a basic necessity. For Ms Mazibuko,8 though, and many others, access to 
water became a luxury. This occurred when the municipality of Phiri decided to 
install pre-payment meters in their dwellings, and to stop providing water, unless it 
had been paid for in advance. This policy was not followed in other richer 
neighbourhoods of Johannesburg. The effect of the measure was that the inhabitants 
of Phiri, who were extremely poor and could not afford to pay, lived in appalling 
conditions.  
 The example of Ms Mazibuko reminds us that such appalling conditions affect 
deeply the ability to pursue worthwhile goals; they also probably have an impact on 
the sense of self-respect and the respect of the others that are in the heart of the notion 
of human dignity. There are two further values that can shed light on the foundations 
of social rights: freedom and citizenship. 
 
Liberty 
Freedom is cherished in liberal societies, and for many it is the value that grounds 
civil rights. Arbitrary detention, restriction of the right to express ourselves or 
infringement of our privacy, seem incongruous with the belief in freedom, and the 
primacy often afforded to the protection of civil and political rights in international 
human rights law and in several national legal systems partly expresses this. When it 
comes to economic need, people are reluctant to present it as lack of freedom. In the 
best case, it is presented as lack of ability to pursue certain activities, because of 
scarce resources. 
When thinking of the individual in relation to the state, freedom is usually 
seen as imposing restraints on governmental power. We have a right to life, religion, 
expression – these are our liberties – and the correlative duty of the authorities is to 
abstain from interference with these liberties. The poor and needy are certainly 
unfortunate. Yet their plight does not constitute a violation of their freedom. They are 
equally well-placed as the rest of us to pursue various goals, and state authorities do 
not impose any restrictions on them.  Insofar as the government does not act, insofar 
as it does not take positive steps to interfere with certain liberties, it cannot be blamed 
for making us unfree, so the libertarian argument goes. The view of some libertarians 
that freedom is simply a negative concept rests on the premise that the distribution of 
resources is fair, insofar as it is a result of the market. Yet this misses the point that 
me hypothetical point in history resources were fairly 
 
8 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, Case CCT 39/09, 2009 ZACC 28. 
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distributed among individuals or gained through desert, there are many reasons 
(including power relations, such as exploitation of workers by employers, or other 
state action, such as inheritance legislation) that may have rendered the allocation of 
resources unfair.  
There is a different, more appealing approach to state duties, which rests on a 
richer understanding of the freedom of the individual. This was captured by Roosevelt 
in his proclamation that ‘true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence. Necessitous men are not free men’.9 It was also expressed 
with passion by one of the delegates during the drafting of the ECHR: ‘What indeed 
does freedom mean?’ it was asked, ‘[w]hat does the inviolability of the home mean 
for the man who has got no home? What is the value of sacred family rights and 
family liberties for the father who is permanently haunted by the spectre of 
unemployment?’.10  
Freedom and resources are inextricably linked, because our rules that regulate 
property impose normative constraints on the liberty of others. The impact of 
economic need on freedom was analysed by G.A. Cohen in his essay ‘Freedom and 
Money’,11 which argued that lack of money does not only restrict our ability to act, 
but also our freedom. An example that Cohen uses to illustrate the links between 
freedom and resources is that of a woman who wants to go to Glasgow to visit her 
family, but has no money to pay her train fare. To the statement that she is still free to 
travel, we would respond that this understanding of freedom is too narrow, because as 
soon as this woman gets on a train without a ticket, she will be asked to get off. The 
plight of homelessness, to give another example, involves the restriction of numerous 
freedoms. The freedom of the homeless to act is too limited. In order to be free to do 
something, as Waldron put it, we need to be able to do it somewhere.12 The homeless 
person, though, has nowhere to go, other than sleep rough in the street or under 
bridges. How can we say that people are free, then, if the options that are open to 
them are extremely limited (if they have any at all), because of the constraints that our 
property rules impose? People are not free if they do not have at least some valuable 
choices; people are completely unfree if they have no choice at all. Given that 
societies are organized by some form of market economy, choice and resources are 
inextricably linked. 
That freedom is not merely a negative concept is also evident when thinking 
about the relationship between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socio-
economic rights, on the other. The division between civil liberties and socio-economic 
rights is far from sharp, and the two groups of rights may lend support to each other. 
In 1993, for instance, the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme for Action that stated that ‘all human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat 
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the 
 
9 FD Roosevelt, Address Before the Democratic National Convention, 1936. 
10 European Convention on Human Rights, Travaux Preparatoires, (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 
Vol. I, p. 42. 
11 GA Cohen, ‘Freedom and Money’, available at http://www.howardism.org/appendix/Cohen.pdf  
12 J Waldron, ‘Homelesness and the Issue of Freedom’, in Liberal Rights (Cambridge, CUP, 1993), 
Chapter 13. 
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same emphasis’.13 Numerous declarations of the international community repeated 
that all human rights are closely linked, and this same position was advanced in the 
preambles of several treaties. The ideas of indivisibility and interdependence, which 
are not deeply analysed in these statements and declarations, have been examined 
insightfully by James Nickel. Nickel suggested that there may be various degrees of 
supporting relations between rights, some of which are stronger than others, and that 
the higher the level of protection of rights in a country, the stronger the claim of 
indivisibility is rendered.14  
 The truth is that the plight of destitution can be seen as affecting many aspects 
of the freedom of the person: the freedom to act, the freedom to think and the freedom 
to pursue happiness. The only sense in which the desperate destitute is free is that 
whatever she does, she has not much to lose. This cannot be what we have in mind, 
though, when we refer to the sanctity of liberty.  
 
Citizenship: Rights and Belonging 
There is a further idea that needs to be developed here, so as to bring into the debate 
on social rights the notion of collective. This is the dignity involved in being a 
member of a community or society. The relationship between individual rights and 
belonging to a community is best captured by the idea of citizenship. Citizenship 
bridges the gap between liberalism that places its main attention on the value of the 
person, and communitarianism that focuses on the importance of the community. The 
locus classicus on rights of citizenship is the theory of the British sociologist T.H. 
Marshall. In his influential essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, Marshall defined 
citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All 
who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the 
status is endowed’.15 Crucially, equal community membership has come to enshrine a 
wealth of rights. It has three elements: the civil, the political and the social. 
Citizenship has evolved to include a social element, which is not a matter of charity 
with the stigma attached to it that distinguishes between citizens and poor outsiders. 
Social rights are as essential as their civil and political counterparts for a feeling of 
membership of the individual, who will otherwise feel excluded and isolated. 
             Citizenship is not a synonym for nationality in this context. Like equality, 
for example, it is a normative concept both in its material and in its personal 
scope.16 It means that everyone should be the subject of all groups of rights, 
because those who are excluded from rights of citizenship will feel isolated. They 
might even seek to subvert the society that does not treat them as members. It also 
means that everyone should be the subject of these rights. It entails a universalist 
e society is to treat all persons as equal members; the 
 
13 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, para. 5. 
14 J Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations between Human 
Rights’, (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 984. 
15 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in R Goodin and P Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political 
Philosophy – An Anthology (Cambridge, Blackwell, 1997) p 291 at 300. The essay was originally 
published in 1949. 
16 J Waldron, ‘Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision’, in Liberal Rights (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1993), p 271. 
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restriction of basic social rights on the grounds of nationality should require special 
justification. Social or political rights should not be foreclosed, for instance, at least 
to those that are permanent residents, employed and taxed in a country, who 
contribute to the system as much as nationals do. 
            A minimum level of social provision is an essential condition of 
membership to a society that values inclusion, and adds an important dimension to 
the discussion on social rights. It suggests, first, that stability requires treating the 
members of the community with respect, and second that social rights are an 
essential element for a feeling of membership. Social rights and membership are 
inextricably linked. The idea of citizenship enriches our understanding of social 
rights by focusing on the role of membership in society as one of their foundations, 
while accepting the importance of the person’s individuality through the recognition 
of rights.  
 Like civil and political rights, social rights are essential for dignity, liberty and 
citizenship, for the person alone and in a society with others. Why, then, did so many 
constitutional traditions and the international community too, decide to treat them as 
subordinate? Are social entitlements distinct in other ways that might perhaps explain 
the current position of the law?  
 
Common Misconceptions 
The discrepancy in the protection of rights to basic material conditions was in the past 
explained by reasons that were primarily conceptual, although we can probably 
identify their normative underpinnings. The discussion was mainly inspired by 
debates on whether social rights should be made justiciable through courts, and its 
deeper reasons involved the question of judges’ legitimacy to adjudicate on social 
rights. The conceptual division between civil and social rights reflected a poor 
understanding of social entitlements, which was particularly prevalent in the second 
half of the twentieth century, but has some supporters even today. It is important to 
challenge the supposed conceptual division between the two types of entitlements 
before moving on, so as to see whether the actual objections against the legal 
protection of social rights could be seen as objections towards the legal protection of 
aspects of civil and political rights too. The examination of the supposed conceptual 
differences between the two groups of rights will also help us shed light on the 
appropriate legal enforcement of social rights in the sections that follow. 
On one view, social rights are conceptually different to civil and political 
rights in three respects: first, social rights are positive and require government action; 
second, they are costly, demanding state expenditure; third, they are vague. All these 
characteristics bring them into a supposed sharp contrast to civil and political rights 
that entail concrete content, are negative and also cost-free. The statement that the 
various groups of rights differ conceptually is exaggerated and fails after closer 
inspection. Several examples can be used to demonstrate this: having a right to a fair 
trial requires an independent judiciary, which can be expensive to maintain (a civil 
right that is costly); the right to housing might simply require state authorities to stay 
a person’s eviction from her home (a social right that is cost-free); the prohibition of 
torture demands a well-trained police force that will not take advantage of its position 
of power to abuse individuals (a civil right that requires state action).  
  12
                                                       
 
Positive Rights 
In some jurisdictions, like the US, courts insist that the Constitution only imposes 
negative duties. In the case Deshaney v Winnebago County Social Services 
Department,17 for instance, the Supreme Court held that no constitutional duty was 
breached by the authorities’ failure to protect a mentally challenged boy who was 
badly abused by his father. Yet most other jurisdictions provide ample recognition of 
the wide variety of duties that human rights law can impose, showing that civil rights 
can be positive. In Europe, in Oneryildiz v Turkey,18 the ECtHR examined whether 
Turkish authorities violated the right to life by not taking the necessary measures to 
protect the applicants’ relatives, who used to live in extremely poor conditions in a 
site used as a rubbish tip. Following an explosion and a landslide that engulfed some 
slum dwellings, thirty-nine people died. The Court held that Turkey violated the right 
to life by not having taken the necessary positive action to protect human life. The 
fact that the area was dangerous and that the authorities knew or ought to have known 
of the danger constituted particularly weighty considerations in the reasoning. 
Examples of positive duties on state actors, perhaps not cast in terms of social or 
human rights, are to be found in other areas of domestic law too, when looking at 
ordinary legislation.  
              Social rights are not always positive; they also give rise to negative duties. 
This has been exemplified in case-law from South Africa and the ICESCR. The right 
to housing might impose a duty to stay evictions, as the South African Constitutional 
Court held in Grootboom19 and in Port Elizabeth Municipality.20 Similarly, when the 
CESCR found a country to be in violation of the ICESCR for the first time, it was 
with respect to the right to housing and concerned massive expulsions of about 15,000 
families in the Dominican Republic,21 while in another case it emphasised that 
‘evictions carried out in this way not only infringe upon the right to adequate housing 
but also on the inhabitants’ rights to privacy and security of the home’.22 
Henry Shue analysed rights to subsistence and security in his influential book 
Basic Rights, where he claimed that these are basic in the sense that they are essential 
for the enjoyment of all other rights. In order to rebut the positive/negative division 
between subsistence and security rights, Shue argued that what is negative or positive 
is not the right itself, but the duties that correspond to it. He found that duties that are 
co-relative to rights  are threefold: ‘i. Duties to avoid depriving. ii. Duties to protect 
from deprivation. iii. Duties to aid the deprived’.23 A Communication of the African 
Commission of Human Rights can be used to illustrate how the correlative duties of 
rights can be broken down in the following categories: duties to respect, to protect, to 
 
17 489 US 189 (1989). 
18 Oneryildiz v Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, Judgment of 30 November 2004. 
19 Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, Case CCT 11/00, Judgment of 4 October 2000. 
20 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, Case CCT 53/03, Judgment of 1 October 2004. 
21 UN Doc. E/C.12/1991/4, para. 249. 
22 UN Doc. E/C.12/1991/4. See also CESCR, General Comment No 4, para. 18. For further analysis 
see General Comment No 7 on Forced Evictions, and Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
1993/77, para. 1. 
23 H Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, 1996) p. 52. 
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promote and to fulfil.24 On this analysis, the duty to respect is an essentially negative 
obligation to refrain from interference with the resources owned by someone. The 
duty to protect requires the state to adopt legislation and provide remedies. 
Intertwined with this is a duty to promote rights, which requires the state to ensure 
that individuals will enjoy their rights, through raising awareness, for instance. The 
last layer is a duty to fulfil, which is a positive obligation that the state creates the 
appropriate machinery for rights to be realised. The positive/negative rights 
dichotomy is misconceived, on this analysis, for each right might impose several 
different duties, or to use Waldron’s words ‘successive waves of duty’.25 
 
Costs 
Sometimes the satisfaction of rights to basic material conditions requires public 
spending, a matter that leads to conflicts when there is scarcity of resources. It also 
raises questions on which branch of government has legitimacy to decide on resource 
allocation, which will be discussed later on. However, the above examples on forced 
evictions show that aspects of social rights, such as the right to housing, might be 
cost-free. At the same time, that civil and political rights might carry significant 
resource implications is well documented in literature26 and was also illustrated in the 
above examples. In Europe, it was exemplified in a number of cases against 
Ukraine,27 where the ECtHR had to examine the compatibility of extremely poor 
prison conditions with the ECHR. The Court said that the country’s limited resources 
cannot justify prison conditions that attain the minimum level of severity contrary to 
article 3 that prohibits torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Humane treatment 
that is an absolute and non-derogable right under the ECHR and many other human 
rights documents can sometimes demand significant public spending. 
 
Vagueness 
The content of social rights, finally, is not bound to be imprecise. Social rights might 
appear to be abstract, because they have been neglected in legal scholarship, and the 
effort to explore their more concrete meaning has not been as systematic as the 
analysis of civil and political rights until recently. It is important to appreciate, for 
instance, that nothing in the ECHR tells us whether extradition to a country where 
someone is likely to face the death row phenomenon prior to the death penalty 
violates the prohibition of inhuman treatment.28 Nor does the Convention provide in 
clear terms for the right of transsexuals not to disclose their sex to the authorities as 
an aspect of their private life.29 Yet today in Europe people take for granted that 
human rights law imposes these duties. And the reason why it is taken for granted is 
ent, extensive academic debate, legal advocacy, and 
 
24 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001), paras. 44-47.  
25 J Waldron, Liberal Rights, (Cambridge, CUP 1993), p. 214. 
26 S Holmes and C Sunstein, The Costs of Rights – Why Liberty Depends on Taxes  (New York, 
Norton, 1999). 
27 See, for instance, Khokhlic v Ukraine, App. No. 41707/98, Judgment of 29 April 2003, para. 181. 
28 On this see, among others, Soering v UK, App. No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989. 
29 Sheffield and Horsham v UK, App. Nos. 22885/93 and 23390/94, Judgment of 30 July 1998. 
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judicial interpretation, the scope of civil and political rights appears to be relatively 
clear and precise, constantly illuminated and further enriched. For the opposite 
reason, because of lack of rigorous engagement with their content by courts, 
practitioners, academic scholars and others, socio-economic rights are underexplored 
and appear to lack precision.  
 
The ‘integrated approach’ 
Additional evidence that the line between civil and social rights is blurred, emerged 
when courts in several jurisdictions slowly recognised that a state act that violates a 
social right can in fact breach a treaty or a constitution that protects civil and political 
rights. In a development that marked a significant breakthrough in our understanding 
of the links between social and civil and political rights, some courts started to accept 
that both groups of rights have similar moral weight, and they are sometimes so 
closely intertwined that a breach of a social right can constitute a violation of a civil 
and political rights document. The case Sidabras and Dziautas30 of the ECtHR 
exemplifies this trend. The case involved the dismissal and ban from access to public 
and private sector employment of the applicants for a period of ten years, because of 
their status as former agents of the KGB. The Court was prepared to accept that the 
right to private life, protected under article 8 of the ECHR, can encompass what was 
in fact the applicants’ right to work. The case was described, therefore, as a paradigm 
example of an interpretive method that has come to be known as an ‘integrated 
approach’31 to the interpretation of civil and political rights instruments, which opens 
them up to the claims of the economically deprived. 
A similar position has been adopted in several other jurisdictions, such as 
Israel, India, Canada, Namibia, Ireland and Spain, where social rights are not directly 
justiciable. In the context of the UK, perhaps the best illustration of the interpretive 
method that reads socio-economic entitlements into civil and political rights 
documents is the Limbuela, Tesema and Adam case,32 mentioned in the introduction 
of this paper. The applicants, destitute asylum seekers, challenged the compatibility of 
the withdrawal of social support from them and the resulting extreme hardship they 
suffered using article 3 of the ECHR that prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment. 
In an important judgment, the House of Lords held that the extremity of the 
circumstances reached the minimum level of severity that needs to be attained for the 
provision to be applicable. They held that extreme socio-economic deprivation in this 
case constituted a breach of the ECHR. 
The adoption of the integrated approach to the interpretation of civil and 
political rights showed that even in countries that do not explicitly recognise social 
rights in their constitutions, these might sometimes be either essential preconditions to 
the enjoyment of the more traditional civil liberties or simply very similar to them. 
s that the supposed conceptual differences between the 
 advocates, courts and scholars engage in a substantive 
 
30 Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania, App Nos 55480/00 and 59330/00, Judgment of 27 July 2004. 
31 V Mantouvalou, ‘Work and Private Life: Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania’, (2005) 30 European 
Law Review 573.  
32 R (on the application of Limbuela, Tesema and Adam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] UKHL 66. 
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examination of their moral weight. This debate is really a distorted reflection of 
certain judgments about the limits of adjudication, because the traditional debate on 
the protection of social rights revolves around the role of courts in interpreting and 
implementing abstract norms, and the effect of individual petition on claims of social 
justice. The following section turns to explore this. 
 
4. Legal Protection 
When thinking of rights to fundamental necessities, something significant is gained, 
which we realise if we express the same claim in a different vocabulary. The sentence 
‘I have a right to housing’ entails a moral imperative that cannot be captured by the 
sentences ‘I would prefer not to be homeless’ or ‘It would be good if I had a home’, 
or even ‘I need shelter’. Having basic social rights invests these claims with 
normative weight, and also necessarily implies that others have a duty to respect, 
protect and fulfil these rights. It seems that such is the weight and urgency of these 
moral claims that any decent government must prioritise them. If these rights are 
breached, the duty-holder is required to be somehow held accountable, for otherwise 
these claims would appear like paper-tigers.  
Some say that the ‘social rights discourse’ or the ‘human rights discourse’ 
depoliticise us, as if these words have a magic power that determines political 
attitudes; that people become somehow passive, and do not engage in politics if some 
claims to justice are couched in the language of rights. This is correct, in the sense 
that rights are above politics and should not be decided in ordinary political discourse. 
Social rights are constitutional essentials that ought to be removed from political 
bargaining. They have to be protected irrespective of whether we have a socialist or a 
conservative government. Social rights ‘trump’33 the utilitarian calculations of the 
markets, which promote economic efficiency only. They provide a safety net that 
ensures that no one will suffer overwhelmingly by the failures of our economic or 
social system, no matter what the government prefers. In this sense, rights to basic 
goods ought to be above politics.   
At the same time, the statement that social rights in Constitutions depoliticise 
people by definition is deeply misleading. Constitutional social rights entail a 
profound political statement that the provision of basic material conditions is not a 
matter of charity; that these entitlements of the needy can impose duties on the 
affluent. The concern of the opponents of the ‘social rights discourse’ is mistaken 
because social rights in fact have potential to inspire political movements, rather than 
lead to apathy, to motivate individuals and encourage them to engage with questions 
that they might otherwise only see as an optional matter, rather than an urgent 
political duty. In this sense, social rights can mobilise and politicise people 
profoundly.  
Expressing access to basic material goods in terms of rights, therefore, makes 
us think: Does the law adequately protect the individual from poverty and its plights? 
 
33 I am borrowing the term ‘rights as trumps’ from Ronald Dworkin, who uses it to refer to civil rights. 
See R Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, in J Waldron (ed) Theories of Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1984) p. 153.  
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The sections that follow examine the role of courts and legislatures for the protection 
of social rights, attempting to assess their prospects and challenges. 
 
The Role of Courts 
The traditional debate on social rights involves their judicial protection, particularly 
through individual petitions. The position that courts are not the appropriate forum to 
hear claims arising from socio-economic deprivation is typically supported by three 
lines of considerations. First, that judges do not have the appropriate expertise; 
second, that judges are conservative and cannot be trusted, for they are likely to 
undermine socio-economic interests, rather than advance them; third, that the courts 
lack legitimacy in the field of social and economic rights. 
 
Expertise 
A matter that is commonly presented as lying in the heart of the adjudication of social 
rights involves the courts’ lack of expertise. Social rights are supposed to raise 
questions of a technical nature, which should be left to housing experts, economists 
and health-care providers to address. However, as Alston has perceptively stated, ‘[t]o 
suggest that economic rights issues should be dealt with exclusively by economists 
and others is tantamount to suggesting that civil and political rights issues should be 
seen as the exclusive domain of criminologists, trade unionists, psychologists, 
physicians, pediatricians, the clergy, communication experts and others’;34 but human 
rights law itself is a ‘subfield of expertise’.35 Judges can be trained to deal with 
technical questions, and can hear experts’ opinions, as it frequently happens in court. 
In the same way that experts participate in a criminal trial to assess forensic evidence, 
they could also take part in a case that involves the right to healthcare, for instance, in 
order to assess medical issues that reach beyond the court’s knowledge. In addition, 
the judiciary could also take note of materials of expert bodies that have previously 
examined the matters under consideration, something that already happens in certain 
jurisdictions.36 
 It is also important to remember that courts already adjudicate on claims to 
socio-economic provision when they implement ordinary legislation (not 
constitutional law). Anne Marie Rogers, for instance, won a legal battle in the UK, 
which gave her access to Herceptin, a drug that treats breast cancer.37 She based her 
application for judicial review on the 1977 National Health Service Act, and claimed 
that the refusal of the authorities to provide her and others in her condition access to 
the drug that would significantly prolong her life was unlawful. In this context, the 
Ms Rogers should be given the drug that prolonged her 
 
34 P Alston, ‘US Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for 
an Entirely New Strategy’, (1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 365 at 375. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See, for instance, C Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’, (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 
257.  
37 The Queen on the application of Ann Marie Rogers v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust, Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), 12 April 2006 [2006] EWCA Civ 392. 
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life by at least three years. The Court was presented with technical information 
regarding the importance of the provision of Herceptin to Ms Rogers,38 which it 
evaluated in the course of judicial review. Cases such as this also exemplify a point 
raised earlier, namely that socio-economic questions and claims to positive state 
action do not necessarily appear in the guise of constitutional social or human rights 
claims. 
Judges can, therefore, deal with technical socio-economic questions. Can we 
trust that they will properly protect social rights, though, or is the nature and 
composition of the judiciary such as to make this endeavour hopeless? 
 
The composition and character of the judiciary  
Some progressive scholars, supporters of the interests protected by socio-economic 
rights, oppose the idea of empowering courts to address claims to welfare provision. 
They argue that judges are conservative and should not be entrusted with this task. 
The reasons that lead to this scepticism differ in each country where this concern is 
raised: in the UK for instance, it is commonly said that the top judges are middle or 
upper-class, white males, educated at elitist institutions. This is problematic because 
courts are not representative of the interests of the society at large, and have no 
understanding or sympathy for the needy. Due to their background, the decisions they 
reach are likely to be hostile to the pleas of necessitous people.39  
The empirical observation that focuses on the conservative character of the 
judiciary is contextually-dependent. In some jurisdictions, there are examples from 
the case law that justify this scepticism. In the UK, for instance, courts are notoriously 
reluctant to protect social rights – a point that is exemplified in numerous labour law 
cases.40 In the US too, it is established jurisprudence that constitutional rights do not 
impose positive obligations, and it is unlikely that the courts will easily change their 
position.41 In Canada labour law scholars commonly suggest that the judiciary is not 
friendly to socio-economic interests of the poor.42  
To the empirical claim that a certain particular composition of the judiciary in 
some jurisdictions can be harmful to the interests of the weakest, the response should 
be empirical. The fact that the judiciary might be prejudiced in certain circumstances, 
because of the judges’ background, should not foreclose outright the judicial avenue 
to the vulnerable. Concerns over the character of the judiciary should be addressed by 
revising the appointment methods and by training the judges according to the 
er than abandoning the idea of the judicial protection of 
eover, the fact that judges may be conservative in 
 
38 Ibid, paras. 8-15. 
39 J Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London, Fontana Press, 1970). 
40 K Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Labour Law’ (1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 275 and V 
Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’, (2008) 71 Modern 
Law Review 912.  
41 R West, ‘Unenumerated Duties’ (2006) 9 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 
221.  
42 H Arthurs and  B Arnold, ‘Does the Charter Matter?’ (2005) 11 Review of Constitutional Studies 37. 
Cf J Fudge, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: The Implications of 
the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and Beyond’, (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 25. 
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particular contexts, does not mean that they are by definition always conservative, as 
the House of Lords judgment in the Limbuela case that was discussed in the 
introduction of this essay reminds us. The adoption of the integrated approach to the 
interpretation of civil rights documents, which was mentioned earlier, provides further 
evidence of judges that show receptiveness to socio-economic claims. More 
generally, the judiciary can, and sometimes has indeed played a significant role in 
social transformation. Several examples from jurisdictions in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, Africa and Asia exhibit its potential, which has been described by Gargarella, 
Domingo and Roux as ‘an institutional voice for the poor’.43 To this interesting 
comparative study that presents the role of courts for social change, it is crucial to add 
an important collection of empirical studies on the role of social rights’ adjudication 
in developing countries: the study ‘Courting Social Justice’ gathers and analyses 
evidence on the role of courts as en element that determines the overall impact of 
‘legalization of policy-making’. Gauri and Brinks find that in the countries examined 
courts neither take on an excessively activist nor a very deferential role, contrary to 
the views expressed by some ‘judicialization jeremiads’. In the case-studies, judges 
emerge to be open to the claims of the needy. Their decisions, in turn, ‘do not so 
much as stop or hijack the policy debate as inject the language of rights into it and add 
another forum for debate’.44  
There are further important examples of individual judges, who have exhibited 
perceptiveness to the claims of the needy. Judge Albie Sachs of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa constitutes one of the most enlightening and inspiring 
instances. Judge Sachs has sat in many social rights cases and has also published 
extensively on the role of social rights in courts. In the autobiographical book The 
Strange Alchemy of Life and Law, Sachs described the painful process of adjudicating 
socio-economic rights. Sachs’s sensitivity to the claims of the weak and the 
economically vulnerable is particularly evident in chapter 7, entitled ‘The Judge who 
Cried: The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’, where he makes 
reference to the Hoffman case that involved the refusal of South African Airways to 
hire an HIV-positive individual.45 Delivering a judgment that upheld Mr Hoffman’s 
right to be employed by South African Airways, Judge Sachs describes how his eyes 
were filled with tears, feeling ‘an overwhelming sense of pride at being a member of a 
court that protected fundamental rights and secured dignity for all’.46  
The empirical claim that a particular composition of a court is conservative 
and might be hostile to socio-economic interests cannot take us far in our normative 
enquiry. The action that is needed, should the truthfulness of this consideration be 
established through empirical research, is not to abandon justiciable social rights 
altogether, because the judicial protection of social rights has a valuable role in 
modern democracies, as will be argued below. It is an agonising call for reform of our 
ining of our judges. 
 
43 R Gargarella, P Domingo and T Roux (eds.), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies 
(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006).  
44 V Gauri and DM Brinks, ‘A New Policy Landscape: Legalizing Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World’, in Gauri and Brinks (eds.), Courting Social Justice (Cambridge, CUP, 2008) 303 
at 304 and 343. 
45 Hoffman v South African Airways, Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 17/00, 28 
September 2000. 
46 A Sachs, The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (Oxford, OUP, 2009) p. 183. 
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Legitimacy 
The third objection against the justiciability of socio-economic rights involves the 
courts and their institutional role. A central constitutional principle of the modern 
state is that of the separation of powers: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. 
If social rights are made justiciable, the judiciary will interfere with resource 
allocation, which is not in its realm of competence, violating the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. 
The position that presents the judicial protection of social rights as a breach of 
the principle of the separation of powers is exaggerated. It underestimates, first, the 
fact that there is no sharp analytical division between social rights and civil and 
political rights, a point that was proven earlier. This necessarily means that if social 
rights, or better some of their correlative duties, bear close resemblance to civil and 
political rights, then the legitimacy objection should apply equally to all human rights 
claims, at least when they give rise to duties that are costly or positive. It would imply 
that when the right to a fair trial imposes a duty to provide legal aid to the poor and a 
duty to train judges or when the right not to torture imposes a duty to train the police 
force, courts should not have the power to decide these cases, so as to not interfere 
with the budget. Yet because all rights can be costly, this view of the role of courts in 
their protection is dangerously narrow, for it excessively restricts the content of the 
correlative duties. The position that courts should never examine questions of human 
rights where these involve positive duties or the allocation of resources, is supported 
by very few scholars today, and has been convincingly rebutted by proponents of 
judicial review.47  
It is crucial to bear in mind that the idea of the separation of powers does not 
require a watertight division between the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
branch of government. The principle of the separation of powers is tied to the idea of 
‘checks and balances’, which means that each of the branches of government ought to 
interfere with the others in certain circumstances, so as to ensure that they do not 
abuse their allocated areas of competence. The objection resting on institutional 
competence should not be seen as giving rise to ‘all or nothing’ solutions. It raises 
subtle questions regarding the legitimate degree of judicial intervention and brings the 
question of democracy to the forefront of the debate.  
 
Democracy  
What is the relationship between social rights and democracy? Here it will be argued 
that democracy, properly understood, requires satisfaction of certain basic needs. The 
judicial protection of social rights, moreover, is compatible with democratic values 
and, often, helps to strengthen them.  
 
47 See J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, OUP, 1999) and responses by D Kyritsis, 
‘Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review’, (2006) 26 OJLS 733 and A Kavanagh, 
‘Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 451. 
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Let us, first, consider the key definitions. We need to recall that social rights 
are rights to the satisfaction of basic needs. Let us now turn to democracy, which is a 
contested concept. In a democracy, people participate in the creation of the rules by 
which they are governed. When reference is made to this system of governance, we 
do not usually have in mind direct democracy. Democracy is today indirect and 
representative. Decisions reached are rarely unanimous; they are made by majorities. 
To suggest that any decision reached by a majority is democratic, though, would 
reflect a poor and inadequate view of democracy. There are other, much better, 
conceptions of democracy: liberal and social democracy; participatory and 
deliberative democracy.  
The best definitions of democracy entail not only procedural elements, 
involving the electoral system for instance, but also some key substantive features: a 
list of basic liberties that prevail over the will of majorities. This can be described as a 
liberal democracy. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, only sees the decision of a majority 
as legitimate, if it is a majority in a community of equals. He draws a distinction 
between ‘statistical’ and ‘communal’ democracy,48 and suggests that communal 
democracy is central in all charters of rights. On this understanding a democratic 
decision is legitimate if people have expressed their will from a position of political 
equality. Social democracy bears similarities to the liberal conception of democracy, 
but pays special attention to economic power and to the importance of democratising 
not only the institutions of the state, but also those that exercise economic power. 
Other contemporary conceptions of democracy place emphasis on the value of 
citizens’ participation in the political process. These models are first, the participatory 
and, second, the deliberative model. According to the participatory conception, the 
key aim of a democracy is the participation of citizens in decision-making. The 
deliberative model considers that for decision-making to be legitimate, it ought to take 
account of all those who will feel the impact of the decisions reached, so as to 
promote impartiality.  
For the best models of democracy the existence of at least a minimum of 
socio-economic provision is crucial. This point can be supported by considering the 
relationship between certain social rights and political rights or political participation. 
Those who have not received basic education, for instance, or those who have no 
basic nutrition are unlikely (and are most probably not interested) to participate in the 
decision-making process. In fact, sometimes the destitute cannot even exercise their 
most basic political right, the right to vote, because in order to be included in the 
electoral register, they need a permanent home address that homeless people do not 
have. Certain social and economic rights may be essential for the best models of 
democracy, for they are enabling conditions for participation. Citizens who do not 
live in dire poverty are more willing and more capable to be politically active; they 
are most probably in a position of knowledge, thanks to their education, and also feel 
that their society treats them with respect. The destitute feel disrespected in the 
country that treats them with contempt. A condition of democratic governance is not 
only the respect of civil and political rights, but also the protection of social rights, 
without which a democracy will be imperfect. 
With all the above models of democracy, where decisions are reached by 
be exactly the power that majorities can exert over 
 
48 R Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, (London, Chatto and Windus, 1990) p. 35. 
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minorities. In countries where the majority is relatively affluent, the poor and 
marginalised minorities, who in the words of Joseph Carens, are ‘hard to locate on the 
map of democracy’,49 have a very weak voice. The needy are often under-represented 
in parliament, and the power to express their views in public debate is minimal or 
non-existent. The majorities and their elected representatives can take decisions that 
neglect their interests and oppress them – decisions in which some are never given a 
right to express a view, or in which their view has been disregarded. On the other 
hand, in countries where the majority live in poverty, the poor are often ruled by a 
minority elite that again neglects their interests. The example of Limbuela, Tesema 
and Adam, the destitute asylum seekers of our introduction, reminds us of those who 
have not been represented, who have not had their voice heard and whose interests 
may have not been taken into account in the decisions of the majorities.  
The role of judicial review when courts are properly constituted and do not 
only represent the powerful elites, is partly to correct the deficiencies of democratic 
systems and their effect on the most vulnerable. Here the judiciary can protect the 
rights of the few against the oppressive power of the many. The fact that the judiciary 
is unelected and unaccountable might in fact be not a weakness. Lack of democratic 
accountability might be an invaluable strength. This is because judges are in some 
contexts less likely to succumb to populist pressures, unlike politicians who seek to be 
re-elected.  
The institution of judicial review plays a different role in each type of 
democracy, described earlier. In a liberal or social democracy judicial review ensures 
the protection of civil and social rights that are essential for the regime. For the 
deliberative model, the court can serve as another forum of deliberation. The 
deliberative conception of democracy in connection to social rights has been analysed 
by Roberto Gargarella.50 The judiciary, here, is not seen as the final decision-maker, 
and the value of the judicial decision is not limited to the resolution of the conflict, as 
deliberation is a continuous process. The idea that the judicial decision does not 
provide a final determination of the matter under examination, but that it in fact 
constitutes part of a dialogue with the legislature, has been described in certain 
constitutional orders that promote this model, as a ‘dialogue between courts and 
legislatures’ or a ‘democratic dialogue’. In this context, it has been suggested that the 
judicial protection of rights affords them a prominent role and makes them central in a 
dialogue with the legislative body that has an opportunity to consider how to address 
the judicial determination.51 Courts are ‘an engine of public debate’, a function that 
they are well-placed to exercise, as they hear complaints of the weakest, who might 
otherwise be excluded from politics; they also force the powerful to justify their 
decisions.52 For deliberative democracy, the additional value of judicial review, as put 
 
49 J Carens, ‘Live-in Domestics, Seasonal Workers and Others Hard to Locate on the Map of 
Democracy’, (2008) 16 Journal of Political Philosophy 419. 
50 R Gargarella, ‘Theories of Democracy, the Judiciary and Social Rights’, in Gargarella, Domingo, 
Roux (eds.), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006) p. 13 
at 27. 
51 For analysis in the Canadian context, see PW Hogg and A Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between 
Courts and Legislatures’, (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75. For analysis in the UK context, see 
A Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford, Hart, 2008). 
52 Gargarella, above n 50, pp. 28-29. 
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by Gargarella, lies in the role of the judgment and its reasoning for the deliberative 
process.  
The justiciability of social rights, in other words, is compatible with a 
democracy, and may strengthen it. Here the role of litigation ought to be considered in 
some more detail. 
 
Effects of Litigation 
Litigation opens up an opportunity to participate to those that are excluded from 
democratic politics, who have no right to vote or whose interests are not represented 
by the majority in parliament. Yet it is sometimes suggested that the majority of the 
poor and marginalised do not have the means to seek judicial protection. Is this 
objection justified? It seems fair to say that litigation for social rights can generally be 
more inclusive and more effective than this position suggests.53 Should a case be 
won, the individual applicant will often not be the only beneficiary. In some 
countries, a court order leads to an automatic amendment of the legislation. In other 
instances it opens up a dialogue with the legislative body. Elsewhere it puts political 
pressure on governments that might then amend the law which was ruled to be in 
breach of human rights law. In this way other people found in a similar situation to 
the individual applicant benefit from the finding of a violation.54 Moreover and more 
generally, the judicial protection of social rights in countries such as South Africa and 
India has led to debates on the constitutional protection of social rights in other 
countries, where this category of entitlements is traditionally regarded as non-
justiciable.55 Litigation, in other words, can have a much wider impact 
In response to the argument that the poor and marginalised cannot have access 
to court because litigation is expensive, it ought to be said that today the right to legal 
aid is recognised in many jurisdictions for those that are in economic want.56 
Obstacles of this type could also make us appreciate other ways in which litigation is 
already in some countries or has potential to become more inclusive. Strategic 
litigation, which is brought by NGOs or other activists, class action, which involves 
collective adjudication for groups of victims, or group action, whereby associations – 
trade unions, for instance – are able to bring claims on behalf of their members, can 
promote inclusiveness in judicial protection. Campaigners and other organisations 
have sometimes a right to participate in legal proceedings as amici curiae, something 
that is used, for example, both by the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. A variety of different techniques that lead to wider 
participation in litigation create a platform for ‘pressure through law’,57 which can be 
 
53 See also V Gauri and DM Brinks, Courting Social Justice (Cambridge, CUP, 2008)  pp. 338-340. 
54 For an overview, see Social Rights Jurisprudence, M Langford (ed.) (Cambridge, CUP, 2008). 
55 See, for instance, the UK Joint Committee of Human Rights, 29th Report, Session 2007-2008, 
Chapter 5.  
56 See, for instance, the judgment of the ECtHR Airey v Ireland, App No 6289/73, Judgment of 9 
October 1979. 
57 For a study on this, see C Harlow and R Rawlings, Pressure through Law (London, Routledge, 
1992). 
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ble, as it can lead to a closer engagement between the judiciary and political 
actors.  
On social rights in particular, the interesting Indian experience of public interest 
litigation provides us with useful insights. In this system, the Indian Supreme Court 
has opened up standing requirements, allowing any member of the public to initiate 
proceedings on behalf of people who ‘by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability 
or socially or economically disadvantaged position, [are] unable to approach the 
Court for relief’.58 This is coupled by a flexible approach to the criteria of 
admissibility of complaints, which has led the Indian Court to hear cases even if 
applicants have not followed the formal procedure. Public interest litigation has given 
impetus both for social change and for a change in public culture, which sees judicial 
ings as a forum for debate between judges, state authorities and other 
organisations.  
The remedies that a court can order can at the same time have an effect not 
only on the individual applicant, but also on others. In Europe, for instance,  the 
ECtHR developed the idea of ‘pilot judgments’, which identify structural problems 
through individual petitions, and indicate legislative measures that can be taken to 
address these problems.59 Respondent states more generally, even without the use of 
pilot judgments, tend to comply with the decisions of the ECtHR by not only 
awarding compensation to the individual, but also by amending the legislation that led 
to the breach of the ECHR. In America, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
can order guarantees of non-repetition, which include an order to adopt new 
legislation, and implement policies and programmes that are consistent with human 
rights obligations.60 The Constitutional Court of South-Africa has also emphasised 
that in a country where the majority of the poor do not have the means to have access 
to courts, because of lack of resources, the courts have a special duty ‘to “forge new 
tools” and shape innovative remedies’.61 At the same time, initiating litigation has 
potential to lead to mediation, which can reconcile the competing interests of the 
parties without being adversarial and without carrying the economic costs of the 
62
he judicial avenue can lead to a somewhat more systematic solution to the 
problem that is triggered by an individual case brought to a court. 
It is also important to appreciate that litigation for social rights might 
contribute to the quest for social justice in two further ways: first, it might raise 
awareness by attracting publicity that socially deprived people would not otherwise 
have the means and the power to attract. Thanks to litigation, for instance, we become 
more aware of post-apartheid socio-economic inequalities in South Africa or the 
rkers in Europe.63 Second, on a more substantive point, 
 
58 S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford, OUP, 2008) p. 126. 
59 See Broniowski v Poland, App. No. 31443/96, Judgment of 22 June 2004. 
60 See, for instance, Case of Children’s Rehabilitation v Paraguay, Judgment of 2 September 2004, 
Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C), No. 112. 
61 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, (CCT14/96) [1997] ZACC 6; 1997 (7) BCLR 851; 1997 (3) 
SA 786 (5 June 1997), para. 69. 
62 See the discussion in Port Elizabeth Municipality, Case CCT 53/03, Judgment of 1 October 2004. 
63 See the judgment of the ECtHR Siliadin v France, App. No. 73316/01, Judgment of 26 July 2005 
and V Mantouvalou, ‘Servitude and Forced Labour in the 21st Century: The Human Rights of Domestic 
Workers’, (2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal 395. 
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individual claims for social justice push us all to think deeper about the principles that 
should govern our society. The judicial avenue gives the opportunity to a claimant to 
present her concern, forces state authorities to justify their action or omission, and 
requires courts to decide, providing moral reasons. Litigation for social rights, then, is 
not only beneficial for the individual or the group that bring a claim and have their 
voice heard. Even a wrongly decided case could be beneficial for u
ons that our elected representatives make, 
and the key arguments for the principles of social justice that we adopt. The judicial 
protection of social rights has potential to have this crucial effect too. 
Social rights adjudication can make a significant contribution to the protection 
of social rights. It can correct some of the deficiencies of our majoritarian systems by 
giving voice to the poor and marginalised: an individual can have her voice heard, 
might receive compensation, as well as an official recognition that her treatment was 
unjust; sometimes the legislation is amended following the finding of a breach, and 
other times a dialogue between the judiciary and other political actors begins. The 
judicial process more generally imposes an obligation on the authorities to justify 
their actions, and the judicial decision can provide reasons to the person that is 
suffering. Judicial reasoning can serve as an input to more general debates of social 
justice. The decision and surrounding debate can raise awareness about the particular 
problem that it highlights. It can also make us think harder about our principles of 
social justice. The justiciability of social rights in countries that have come to serve as 
paradigm examples in this matter, such as South Africa, can further lead to public 
debate in contexts
Constitu
o
society as a whole.  
 
The Role of Legislatures 
Yet placing all our attention on courts would provide a picture that is incomplete and 
impoverished. Although a judicial decision leads to the amendment of legislation in 
some countries, which has an effect on a large number of people and not only on the 
individual applicant, it is generally reactive. An injustice is most often addressed if an 
individual claimant or a group brings a complaint. Change triggered by successful 
applications might lack the systematic planning that respect for principles of social 
justice requires. This situation also raises questions about the distributive implications 
of judicial decisions on social rights in certain contexts.64 In addition, crucially, state 
inaction that leads sometimes to pervasive injustice might not be sufficiently targeted 
through justiciability, because courts might often be reluctant to impose positive 
duties on state authorities.65 In some countries, moreover, the key concern voiced in 
liberal scholarship is that the judiciary will simply not be open to socio-economic 
ative composition. Or that even if the composition of 
 
64 See, for instance, O Ferraz, ‘The Right to Healthcare in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health 
Inequities?’ (2010) 11 Health and Human Rights 1. 
65 R West, ‘Ennobling Politics’, Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1172204. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1172204, p. 21; also in Jefferson Powell, Boyd White (eds), Law and 
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this body is favourable to a social rights claim, it might still perceive itself as having 
restraints (institutional mainly), and would not go as far as we might believe th
ould be disappointed, we would question the 
role of legal enforcement of social rights, and we might even start questioning the 
point of using the term ‘human rights’ altogether. We would become sceptics.  
But the moral force and the transformative potential of social rights does not 
end here. It has another aspect, which is proactive rather than reactive. It involves the 
role of legislatures, and has mainly been developed by progressive US thinkers. To 
put this debate in context, it is important to be reminded that the US Supreme Court 
does not recognise positive duties: according to well-established jurisprudence, duties 
that correspond to constitutional rights are negative, requiring minimal government. 
In response to this Robin West, for instance, has stressed that constitutional substance 
should not be limited to the adjudicated Constitution. West insightfully and forcefully 
analysed the role of legislatures in her discussion of the ‘legislated Constitution, the 
Constitution looked to by the conscientious legislator as he or she seeks to fulfil her 
political obligations’.66 On this analysis, it is essential to realise that principles of 
rights are addressed to l
islature has a primary duty to legislate for basic material 
conditions, while the court has an obligation to examine if legislation is compatible 
with this primary duty.  
The moral, political or legal duties of legislatures have been neglected in 
academic scholarship on social rights. A common problem identified by West is that 
moral questions are equated to constitutional questions, constitutional questions are 
equated to legal questions, and legal questions are equated to judicial questions. On 
this understanding, all moral questions end up being questions that the judiciary 
addresses; the way that the judiciary responds to them also constitutes what the law 
says.67 If the constitution or other law of a status higher than ordinary legislation, and 
constitutional jurisprudence, does not impose duties to legislate for basic material 
conditions, these duties are perceived as non-existent both as a matter of law and as a 
matter of morality. In the US, for instance, where courts reject the position that 
constitutional rights impose positive duties altogether, legislators are seen as neither 
under a moral, nor a political nor a legal obligation to act positively and adopt 
legislation that will promote welfare provision. Constitutiona
litical justice to constitutional justice, which is for them the adjudicated 
constitution. If the adjudicated Constitution does not recognise duties to legislate for 
basic material conditions, these duties are neglected altogether. 
It is crucial to uncouple moral questions from the adjudicated Constitution 
because constitutional principles are not solely those proclaimed by courts. There is 
also the ‘Political Constitution’, the Constitution that guides the political process and 
sets the standards towards which politics should strive, as well as those against which 
 
islated Constitution’, in Balkin and Siegel (eds.) The 
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e of these issues will further be analysed in the section that follows.  
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judiciary is regarded as the sole virtuous branch.68 This is an incomplete 
understanding not only of constitutional substance. It is, ab
 between state and citizen’.   
The position that legislators might have duties – moral, political or 
constitutional – to legislate for the satisfaction of basic material conditions, leads to 
new lines of enquiry. The key challenge is to be imaginative about how such 
arguments will be made in an influential manner. In some contexts, it is true that the 
legislative body might be more receptive to academic arguments than the courts are, 
though this is not necessarily so. There is a need to think how the universities, 
organisations that promote social justice and others will have an input to the 
legislative process. West suggests, for instance, that law students should be 
encouraged to do internships not only with judges, but also with legislators, and that 
university education should provide them with such possibilities. At the same time 
activists in the area of social rights might need to turn to strategies that do not only 
involve courts, but also political lobbying. This already happens in India, for example, 
where courts are receptive to social rights claims, but whose decisions do not always 
bring about the desirable change.70 These are no doubt big challenges, and differ from 
one country to another, with their distinct legal systems, traditions and social 
problems, while some of these challenges a
It is essential to take both the judicial and the legislative avenue for the sake of 
the most vulnerable amongst us. The legislators who are elected and accountable have 
a primary obligation to adopt legislation that promotes basic welfare provision. The 
action or inaction of the elected branch will then be of judicial concern. The role of 
the court is to examine whether people’s social rights are rightly prioritised in the 
legislative process. The exact structure of the relationship between the two bodies will 
depend on the constitutional arrangements in each context, and particularly on the 
extent of judicial powers, but ideally, it should be a relationship of dialogue and
partnership. Som
5. Content of Duties, Right Holders and Duty Bearers 
Whether through explicit constitutional provisions that protect socio-economic rights 
or as components of civil and political rights, or even as directive principles of social 
policy, social rights are already embedded in several legal cultures worldwide. What 
is the content of these abstract claims? Social rights, like civil and political rights, 
might at first glance appear overly vague. What is a right to basic nutrition, someone 
will ask. Do we 
s?  
Most importantly, rights might give rise to dramatic conflicts. In resource-
intensive claims, clashes are often due to scarcity of resources. Conflicts between 
ided if we adopted a libertarian model, where rights 
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simply impose side constraints on government action.71 If the government had an 
obligation not to interfere with a person’s right to expression by not censoring her or  
someone’s right to healthcare by not contaminating the land where she lives, it would 
be harder to envisage immediate conflicts. Because rights are not mere side 
constraints on government action, because rights to basic material provision can also 
impose duties to act (like civil and political rights), a complexity emerges. The right 
to healthcare might require the government to provide an expensive drug to someone, 
which might not always be available for everyone. The provision of an expensive 
drug to everyone who needs it could mean that resources might be limited for free 
primary education of a high standard. Prioritising resources for education might 
reduce the resources available for the creation and monitoring of decent jobs. Very 
often rights give rise to duties that impose a systematic burden on the state budget, 
which is limited. How could limited
 interpreting social rights?  
The interests that underlie social rights, and values, such as the idea of dignity, 
should be able to provide guidance to some of the very complex questions on the 
content of these claims. Two points ought to be made: First, that because rights are 
grounded on urgent interests of the person, they will always trump utilitarian 
calculations in case of conflict between a right and an interest that does not attain the 
status of right. Second, that even if rights trump utilitarian interests, they may still 
clash with each other. In these instances, there will still be a need for 
wever, be of the brute sort that utilitarianism embraces.  
When rights themselves clash, agonising decisions have to be reached by 
governments that decide on resource allocation, and agonising questions ought to be 
answered by courts that are asked to determine complaints. A crucial clarification is 
due here. The above discussion distinguished between the role of courts, on the one 
hand, and the role of legislators, on the other. When thinking about the content of 
rights, it is important to appreciate that this might differ depending on the branch of 
government that examines each particular question. Or more precisely that it is not the 
meaning of rights that is altered; it is rather that what each branch of government can 
order for social rights might differ. The courts, it was said earlier, might not be able to 
decide for the provision of social rights in detail in individual applications that impose 
a heavy and systematic burden on the budget, because an individual complaint might 
not lead to fair distribution of resources. Courts have the power and the duty, 
however, to examine whether government policy is principled, and to declare it, if 
they find it unprincipled. Lawrence Sager suggested that ‘the adjudicated 
Constitution, is reduced from the whole, and the whole of constitutional substance is 
reduced from all political justice’,73 and claimed that welfare entitlements belong in 
the realm of constitutional substance, but not in the domain of adjudication: they are 
part of the ‘underenforced Constitution’.74 Perhaps Sager’s position is appropriate for 
the US model where the Supreme Court has very strong powers, but could be 
modified for other purposes where the argument for social rights is addressed to 
courts, as much as it is 
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Legislative Determination 
The duties of our legislative bodies in the area of social rights are wide. What a court 
can decide and what a court can order on these matters may be more limited to what 
the government is required to do, so as to deliver its constitutional obligations. When 
thinking about the duties of legislatures, the content of state obligations might be 
illustrated by the approach of the CESCR. The CESCR, which provides authoritative 
interpretations of the provisions of the ICESCR, attempted to determine the content of 
states’ obligations in General Comment No. 3.75 This explains that while the 
fulfilment of social rights depends on the availability of resources, some of the 
corresponding duties, such as the prohibition of discrimination, are immediately 
effective. The steps that states should take towards the ‘progressive realisation’ of 
social rights, moreover, ought to be taken immediately, and be ‘deliberate, concrete 
and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognised in the 
Covenant’. Legislation might be essential in order to fulfil the relevant obligations; 
yet the state should also take all other appropriate measures. Finally, there is always a 
minimum core of social rights that the aut
lows in General Comment No. 3: 
10. […] a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent 
upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any 
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education is, prim
under the Covenant […]  
In assessing whether the state complies with its minimum core obligations, the 
Committee pays attention to resource constraints, but in order for a country to blame 
scarce resources for its failure to comply with the minimum core, it has to show that 
it has made very serious effort to address its minimum core duties. The approach of 
the CESCR could usefully serve to determ
ights.  
Two questions might arise here, one involving the relationship between social 
rights and social justice, the other the role of economic efficiency arguments in the 
social rights debate. On the first matter, it is fair to say that each government will 
have a different conception of principles of social justice that it seeks to employ. One 
might follow the account of John Rawls and the ‘difference principle’, for instance, 
and consider that inequalities in the distribution of goods are permitted insofar as they 
work to the benefit of the worst-off.76 What is the relationship between this principle 
as an account of social justice, on the one hand, and basic social rights, when 
addressed to courts and legislators, on the other? Social rights are ‘constitutional 
minima’.77 They do not provide a full account of a theory of distributive justice; they 
ents for a decent life that any account of social justice 
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would have to respect and ensure. Social rights as advocated here, in other words, 
should form the heart of any conception of dis
ost conceptions of social justice. 
As to the relationship between social rights and economic efficiency, there is a 
neoclassical view of the economy, according to which creating a safety net by 
providing for a minimum level of socio-economic provision might harm productivity. 
On this view, people will become idle if basic welfare is guaranteed, and this will in 
turn be problematic for social rights in the long term because the reduction of 
productivity will result in fewer resources for all, including the worst-off in society. 
This argument is often made in the area of labour rights, for instance, where it is 
suggested that the creation of rigidities in the form of basic social rights might 
increase unemployment in the long term.78 It ought to be stressed that this is a 
contested issue and there is no evidence to prove that the protection of basic rights 
harms productivity in reality. In fact it could be suggested that the right to education, 
for instance, provides th
ic flourishing.  
In any case, the efficiency argument would have to be supported by extremely 
compelling evidence in order to play some role in the debate on social rights. A 
government that treats people as means to an end – that of economic efficiency – is 
one that cannot be regarded as decent; its legitimacy is therefore questionable. Letting 
people suffer undernourished, live in unemployment and ill-health without any social 
support, for the reason that the market might do the work – it might promote 
economic flourishing and consequently create more housing, healthcare and 
employment in the long-run – is a position that is contrary to ideas of basic concern 
and respect that a state ought to show towards its members, and goes against the grain 
of human rights law. Short-term human suffering for some supposed long-term goals 
of economic development neglects the value of the person as an individual. It is also 
profoundly undemocratic, if we define democracies as requiring a minimum level of 
social provision, which are based on equal concern and respect or if we opt for a 
deliberative model that values participation of all citizens. Social rights are basic 
preconditions for a fair society, having a central role in addressing the failures of the 
market, which is in any case not designed to operate for the meeting of
all and m
 
Judicial Determination 
Returning to the role of courts in defining the content of social rights, in interpreting 
them and examining the compatibility of other state action with the corresponding 
duties, several positions can be adopted, some being more deferential than others. The 
 depending on the form of judicial review and remedies 
 jurisdictions, when a court finds a violation of a 
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constitutional right, it has the power to strike down legislation that is in breach of the 
relevant constitutional provision. If we have strong review, which gives courts this 
power, the judicial decision is determinative. If there is an interference with social 
rights and a judicial decision is likely to have very wide resource implications, the 
court might rightly refrain from being too activist. However, there is an alternative 
model: weak judicial review. When there is a model of weak review, a court should 
be able to declare that legislation is incompatible with human rights la
will in any case have the final say. 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has refrained from using the 
standard of the ‘minimum core’ of the CESCR, which was presented earlier, opting 
for a model of weak review. Faced with the question of the minimum core of the right 
to housing in the Grootboom case, Yacoob J stated that it did not have the necessary 
information to determine it, unlike the CESCR, which could use states’ reports and 
other materials. The Court has employed the standard of ‘reasonableness’ instead of 
the minimum core. The role of the standard of reasonableness in the judicial 
protection of social rights, particularly when there are resource-constraints, is well 
illustrated in the Soobramoney case. Mr Soobramoney was severely ill with chronic 
renal failure. He requested to have kidney dialysis treatment at the hospital where he 
was being treated, but there were not enough machines available for the necessary 
treatment. His claim was rejected for shortage of resources. In a manner that 
illustrated the painful process of decision-making, Albie Sachs said: ‘If resources 
were co-extensive with compassion, I have no doubt as to what my decision would 
have been’.81 However, resources are limited and the judiciary de ed
 a decision of the authorities that it held to be reasonable.   
The ‘reasonableness’ approach is not foreign territory for human rights 
lawyers. It brings to mind debates on the proper role of unelected bodies like courts in 
other areas of law – debates which are couched in the terms of ‘deference’ in the UK 
or the ‘margin of appreciation’ before the ECtHR.82 The notion of reasonableness 
alone cannot do all the work for if the courts always defer to the government, they do 
not really protect rights. If they always find a violation, they ignore the problem of 
scarcity of resources. Several scholars criticise particularly the standard used by the 
South African Constitutional Court for being overly deferential to the power of the 
legislative and executive branches of government, and others suggest that deference is 
the right way forward for a court that needs to respect political decisions.83 The heart 
of the matter here is that a theory of what is reasonable for the government to do will 
be needed, and the question is wheth
rican Constitutional Court. 
Which is the most appropriate test – a strong or a weaker one – to determine 
the content of social rights when decided by the judiciary is relative to the 
institutional architecture in each country. It will therefore vary from one country to 
volving scarce resources when rights clash might 
 
81 Soobramoney v Minister of Health  (KwaZulu-Natal), Case CCT 32/97, Sachs J, para. 59. 
82 On deference see A Kavanagh, Judicial Review under the Human Rights Act, (Cambridge, CUP, 
2009), Part II. On the margin of appreciation see G Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation’, (2006) 26 OJLS 705. 
83 D Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2008) and O Ferraz, ‘Poverty and 
Human Rights’, (2008) 28 OJLS 585.  
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legitimately compel a court to let the government decide, insofar as this decision can 
be supported by fair principles. While the court might not be able to prescribe how 
resources should be allocated when rights clash, it should be able to determine that a 
certain level of socio-economic provision resists trade-offs when there is a conflict 
with policy considerations that do not attain the status of rights. Suffices it to say that 
social rights can obtain a clear content, as much as civil and political rights can; that 
legislatures have wider obligations than courts; and that courts should hold them 
accountable if they fail to deli
The heart of the argument in this section can otherwise be described as 
follows: the limits of the judicial protection of social rights might be distinct to the 
constitutional meaning of rights.84 Courts and other bodies with judicial functions do 
not have to (and sometimes should not) show excessive activism in individual cases 
that might impose a systematic burden on the allocation of resources to other poor and 
needy individuals that cannot access courts. For legislators social rights should be 
regarded as an absolute priority. The exact degree of this duty would be subject to 
disagreement, of course, but a minimum level of socio-economic provision provided 
by the state as a safety net can obtain a certain degree of objectivity and concreteness, 
and can be determined either by the government alone or by the court and other 
human rights institutions in partnership with the government. It can fairly be said, 
though, that in a manner similar to civil and political rights, social rights can be 
rendered concrete through systematic engagement and moral argument on the scope 
of their correlative duties; and that 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although you and I might desire different things, to conclude, we have certain shared 
fundamental necessities: to water, basic nutrition, housing, healthcare, work and 
others. If these are neglected, we will not be fully human; we shall have no dignity; 
we shall be unfree and feel excluded and disrespected. Because of accidents of history 
– the Cold War in particular – the current legal framework is characterised by striking 
weaknesses in the protection of social rights, their personal scope and the institutional 
design. These
This essay argued that social and economic rights are constitutional essentials 
at domestic level, as much as civil and political rights are; the two groups of rights are 
based on common values and have no sharp conceptual differences. Social rights 
should resist trade-offs and should constitute very weighty considerations for the 
judiciary when adjudicating and for the legislature when legislating. Some legal 
orders have made advances that reflect an understanding of the fundamental character 
of social rights, and their importance 
ic policies lead to destitution.  
 
84 Sager, above n 1, p. 1426. 
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 on how this will be 
ost effectively achieved is, therefore, a pressing need and a challenge for each one 
f us interested in a fairer society and a more just world order.  
                                                       
What has been achieved so far in international and national human rights law, 
thanks to the moral force and the motivating power of these claims, should not be 
underestimated. The judicial protection of social rights has in various countries 
proven capable of providing an important avenue for the poor and needy, while 
important academic scholarship has emerged focusing on legislative duties. Yet there 
are several challenges in all these fields: theoretical enquiry into the best institutional 
arrangements,85 empirical research on the practical limitations of the contribution that 
courts can make, the remedies that best serve the protection of the rights of the poor, 
the role of legislatures in protecting social rights. Societies should be structured in a 
way that shows the concern and respect of the affluent for the basic needs of the poor. 
How this will be achieved is an urgent matter for moral, political and legal argument. 
In addition, there are questions that this essay did not touch upon at all, as it focused 
on the law. How should each one of us show concern for the global poor, how should 
private citizens and the civil society strive to save the lives of those in extre
 with which philosophers are grappling.  
All these complex matters open up numerous avenues for research and for action. 
With their exceptional moral force, social rights provide a starting point that 
captures the key challenges. They reflect the belief that rights to basic material 
conditions are universal and have a distinct status. They provide a basis and a 
motivation for improvement of the many shortcomings of the world order; they have 
otential to inspire and lead social transformation. Reflectionp
m
o
 
 
85 Some of these issues are further discussed in C Gearty, V Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights, 
forthcoming by Hart Publishing in 2010, in the section entitled ‘Global Social Rights’ that involves the 
duties of the affluent towards needy foreigners. 
86 See P Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York, Random House, 2009). 
